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Abstract 
 
We address the optimal timing of investment in gas pipelines when the demand for gas is stochastic. We 
will show that this is a problem that can be solved in theory, but the practical solution depends on functions 
and parameters that are either subjective or cannot be estimated. We will then reformulate the problem in a 
manner that can Pareto rank investment strategies. These strategies can be implemented with reasonably 
straightforward policies. The demand for gas is very inelastic and thus the welfare losses associated from 
small deviations from a first best optimum are minimal. This implies that the gas pipeline system can be 
regulated with a relatively simple set of rules without any significant loss of welfare. Regulation of the gas 
pipeline system can be transparent and a result may be a good candidate for some institutional arrangement 
in which there is substantial private investment in gas pipelines. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
Mexico has adopted a policy of pricing natural gas based on the Houston price 
adjusted for transport cost. This is am application of the well known Little-Mirrlees Rule 
(See Brito and Rosellon, 2002) and results in the market for gas in Mexico having 
essentially the same character as the Houston market. Pemex behaves as a price taker and 
inasmuch as Mexico is importing gas from the United States, the price of gas to Mexican 
consumers reflects the marginal cost of gas to Mexico. 
                                                 
1 The research reported in this paper was supported by grants from the Center for International Political 
Economy to Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University and the Comisión Reguladora de Energía 
to the Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C (CIDE).  The second author also 
acknowledges support from the Repsol-YPF-Harvard Kennedy School Fellows program, and the 
Fundación México en Harvard. 
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Since the Houston market determines the price of gas in Mexico, a necessary 
condition for this policy to work is that gas be able to move to equilibrate supply and 
demand. Thus, it is essential that the pipeline system not be congested. If it does become 
congested, then it becomes impossible to supply the amount of gas that will clear the 
market at the Houston netback price. There will be excess demand and there are no 
institutions in place so that price can be the equilibrating factor. When the pipeline 
system becomes congested in the United States, such as in the summer of 2000, there can 
be disruptive peaks in the price of gas, rents accrue to agents who have access to the 
pipeline, but prices adjust to equilibrate supply and demand. If the pipeline system in 
Mexico were to become congested, the CRE’s netback pricing rule would not be feasible. 
Further, there would not be any market institutions to equate supply and demand and it 
would become necessary to use some political, ad hoc system to allocate the available 
gas. This would be very costly to the Mexican economy. Thus it is very important that 
there be sufficient pipeline capacity so that congestion does not occur. 
Unfortunately, the market is not a good guide to the allocation of resources in 
pipeline capacity. It can take as long as three years lead time to increase pipeline 
capacity, so it is necessary to rely on forecasts of future demands for the purpose of 
planning investment in pipeline capacity. These forecasts are at best uncertain. Mexico’s 
economy is to a large extent driven by economic activity in the United States. As we have 
seen in the recent past, forecasts of United States economic activity three years in the 
future are not always reliable. 
In this paper we will address the optimal timing of investment where the demand 
for gas is stochastic. We will show that this is a problem that can be solved in theory, but 
the solution depends on functions and parameters that are either subjective or cannot be 
estimated. We will then reformulate the problem in a manner that can Pareto rank 
investment strategies. These strategies are not optimal in the strict sense of the word, but 
they can be implemented with reasonably straightforward policies.  
The demand for gas is very inelastic and thus the welfare losses associated from 
small deviations from a first best optimum are minimal.  This implies that the gas 
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pipeline system can be regulated with a reasonably simple set of rules without any 
significant loss of welfare. Regulation of the gas pipeline system can be transparent and a 
result may be a good candidate for some institutional arrangement in which there is 
substantial private investment in gas pipelines. 
2. The Production Function for Gas Pipelines 
 
A simplified formula for computing the rate of flow of gas in a pipeline is given 
by 
(1) Q = 871D 3
8
P1
2 − P22
L
 
where: 
D = internal diameter of pipe in inches 
L = length of line in miles 
Q = throughput in per day 
P1= absolute pressure at starting point 
P2 = absolute pressure at ending point 
The amount of power needed compress a million cubic feet a day is given by 
(2) Z =
R + RJ
R 5.46 +124Log(R)
0.97 − 0.03P
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
where: 
Z = horsepower  
R = the compression ratio, absolute discharge pressure divided by absolute 
suction pressure  
J = supercompressibility factor which we assume to be 0.022 per 100 pounds per 
square inch absolute suction pressure. 
 
Assuming as given the discharge pressure, equation (1) can be used to solve for 
the necessary pressure as function of the throughput. Equation (2) can then be used to 
compute the amount of power necessary. We can use these values to compute the cost of 
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transporting gas. The costs were calculated under the assumptions that the real interest 
rate is 10 percent, the cost of pipeline is $25,000 per mile inch, maintenance costs are 
assumed to be 3 percent, and the cost of gas to power the pumps is $2.00 per thousand 
cubic feet (MCF). The cost of an installed horsepower was assumed to be $600 and the 
project life to be fifteen years. 
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Figure 1 
Pipelines have a high fixed cost, and for a substantial portion of their operating 
region low marginal costs. The capacity of the pipeline is ultimately limited by the 
pressure limits of pipe.  Figure 1 illustrates the cost curves for a 48-inch pipeline 100 
miles long.  At a pressure limit of 1,500 pounds per square inch, the pipeline reached its 
limit at approximately 3,800 million cubic feet per day. The dashed line denotes this 
limit.  At this point it becomes impossible to increase throughput by increasing power 
and it becomes necessary to add compressor stations that increases throughput without 
exceeding the line limit by increasing the pressure gradient. Note that this formulation 
leads to a cost of  moving 1 MCF of gas 1000 miles to be $.50. 
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We have shown in an earlier paper (Brito and Rosellon (2002) that the netback-
pricing rule is the solution of a static welfare optimization problem if the fee for 
transporting gas is the marginal cost of transporting gas. However, marginal cost pricing 
results in a loss or rents. (See Figure 1.) One solution to this problem is to set a fee that 
yields a regulated rate of return over the life of the project sufficient to cover all costs. An 
alternative, more sophisticated alternative is a two-part tariff with a price cap. The 
sophisticated price cap mechanism is efficient in that it sets the marginal cost of 
transporting gas equal to the variable change for moving gas.  The question is whether the 
more efficient allocation of resources merits the additional difficulties in regulation. 
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Figure 2 
 
The shaded area in Figure 2 illustrates the welfare loss associated with using 
average cost rather than marginal cost in transporting gas. The loss, L, is given by 
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AC − MC( )2Qη
2p
  (3) L =
where η is the elasticity of the demand for gas.   Simple calculations suggest that for 
elasticities in the demand for gas in the range of - 0.1 to - 0.2 the welfare loss is of second 
order and can be ignored. If we calculate the dead weight loss for 4 million MCF the 
price of gas equal to $2.00 per 1,000 cubic feet, an elasticity for the demand for gas equal 
to -0.1, and a differential between AC and MC of $0.02, we get that the change in 
demand is 4,000,000 cubic feet and the deadweight loss is $40. Since the cost of moving 
gas is linear with distance, the deadweight loss over a distance of 1000 miles is $400 for 
4 million MCF of gas.  At a price of $4.00 per MCF, the welfare loss would be half. 
The welfare loss associated with using a rate of return fee structure for transport 
pipelines is so small that it is hard to see how the additional complexity in regulation can 
be justified given the low elasticity in the demand for gas in Mexico.  
The low elasticity of the demand for gas has some implications on the 
implementation of the netback rule for pricing natural gas. The net back rule leads to the 
optimal price of gas in that the price of gas is the opportunity cost of gas. However, the 
price of gas is very sensitive to small in the geographical demand for gas. Since demand 
for gas tends to be concentrated at mass point along the pipeline system, a very small 
change in demand can result in a substantial change in the price of gas. Initially this was 
not an issue of policy concern. Gas from the southern fields was reaching Los Ramones. 
However, as of late, the demand for gas in the south of Mexico has increased to the point 
where the physical arbitration point is at Cempoala in the south of Mexico. There is 
pressure on the CRE to move the point used to price gas south to Cempoala. 
In a first best world there is no question that Cempoala is the correct point to price 
gas. The opportunity cost of gas to Mexico is the price of gas in Houston corrected fro 
transport cost. There are two separate independent arguments that can be made against 
moving the arbitration point to Cempoala. First is that it is not a first best world and, in 
theory, there exist incentives for Pemex to invest and produce so as to move the 
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arbitration point south. Whether they do so or not is not a question we cannot answer. As 
economists all we can say is that the incentives to manipulate the price of gas exist. (See 
Brito and Rosellon 2003).  
The second reason is political. Because the demand for gas is so inelastic, pricing 
gas in Mexico is essentially a question of the redistribution of rents. For example, moving 
the arbitration point by 500 miles will cause the price of gas to change by $.50 per MCF. 
At a price of $3.50 per MCF the distortion cause by a subsidy is one-third cent per MCF. 
(See Figure _3__ below). Given the other distortions in the economy, a distortion that 
small is simply not large enough to argue that economic considerations should trump 
political considerations in the setting of the arbitrage. Using Houston as a benchmark to 
price gas is a useful instrument in deciding whether to use natural gas to produce 
ammonia nitrate; it is not a particularly useful tool in allocating the use of gas between 
Monterrey and Puebla.  
Consider the following example. Suppose the arbitration points were at Los 
Ramones and 10 MCF a day of gas was reaching Los Ramones from the southern fields. 
Now a tortillería that consumes 20 MCF of gas a day moves form Monterrey to Puebla. 
The arbitration point is now at Cempoala. Does it make sense to change the entire pricing 
structure of gas in central Mexico because a tortillería has moved from Monterrey to 
Puebela? 
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Figure 3 
3. Timing of Investment in Pipeline Capacity: The General Case 
 
Let us consider the case when gas is being transmitted a distance L over a pipeline 
of diameter D. The demand for gas is given by  
(4) Q(t) = eαtQ D(p)0   
where α  is a random variable with mean α p and p is a random variable with mean  . 
Some of the stochastic elements are short term such as weather and others are long term 
that can reflect macroeconomic conditions tine Mexico and in the United States. 
The pressure limit on the pipeline is Q and we will define T  such that 
 Q = eα T Q0D(p ).  
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Define as the cost of building a pipeline at time t that will come on 
line at time T.   
e−rTC(T − t)
 
 
 
 
Cost 
C(T − t)  
T − t   Δ*
Figure 5 
It is assumed that the cost of construction drops as lead time increase, but that 
there exists some minimum feasible lead time, T − t = Δ*. 
Define f [s,Q(t )]  as the probability at time t that Q(s) = Q  for some s > t , given 
that demand at time t is Q(t) < Q . Define S(n, s) as the consumer surplus lost at time n if 
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the constraint the constraint becomes binding at time s. The welfare loss, W (s) of the 
constraint binding at time s is thus, 
(5) W (s) = S(n, s)ds
s
T∫  
and the expected welfare lost at time t is: 
(6) E[W (t)] = f [s,Q(t)] S(n, s)dnds
s
T∫
t
T∫  
If the constraint binds, the price of gas will have to increase as gas cannot move to 
equilibrate the market at the netback price. 
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Figure 6 
 
Define R(s,n)as the rents at time n if the constraint becomes binding at time s. 
Define the total transfer that results from these rents as Z(s). Thus, if the constraint 
binding at time s, 
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(7) Z(s) = R(s,n)dn
s
T
E[Z(t)] = f [s,Q(t )] R(s,n)dnds
∫  
and the expected value of transfers at time t is: 
(8) 
s
T∫
t
T∫  
These are transfer from the consumers of gas to Pemex and as such they do not 
represent a loss in welfare. The fact that they have chosen not to do so suggests that in 
some political or economic calculation that is more general than the timing of investment 
in pipelines it was decided that the benefits from taxing gas were out weighed by other 
economic or political factors.  
Strictly speaking, the calculation of the optimal timing of pipeline investment 
should be done in the context of the more general problem. This is not possible, but we 
can approximate the more general problem by assigning a cost α  to the transfers so that 
the cost of the transfers is given by 
E X(t)](9) [ = αE Z(t)] 0,  1 ≤ α ≤[
where α = 0 means that there is no cost to the government associated with transfers cause 
by congestion of the pipelines and α =1 means that the interests of the government and 
the consumers of gas are identical. 
We can then compare the outcome of this maximization with policies that are 
Pareto superior under the assumption that the government does not want to tax gas by 
collecting the transfers caused congestion. That is to say, we can assume the government 
does not want this revenue since they could have collected it by taxation and chose not to 
do so. Then, if gas consumers are willing to pay for a level of pipeline capacity that 
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eliminates transfers, then they are better off and no one is worst off. Such a policy would 
be Pareto superior to one that could result in congestion and transfers. 
4. Optimal Investment in Pipeline 
 
Let us assume that Pemex is trying to time investment in gas pipelines to 
minimize a cost function that is the sum of the investment in pipelines, loss of consumer 
surplus and a weight sum of the transfers: 
(10) Y (t) = e−rTC(T − t) + f [s,Q(t)] S(n,s)dnds
s
T∫
t
T∫ + α f [s,Q(t)] R(s,n)dnds
s
T∫
t
T∫  
this expression can be written as 
(11)  Y (t) = e−rTC(T − t) + f [s,Q(t)] [S(n,s) + αR(s,n)]dnds
s
T∫
t
T
dY(t)
∫  
If we differentiate with respect to T, we get 
(12)  
dT
= e [∂−rT C(T − t)∂T − rC(T − t)] + f [T,Q(t)] [S(n,s) + αR(s,n)T∫ ]dn
+ f [s,Q(t)][S(t,s) + αR(t,n)
t
T∫ ]ds
T
T
dY t
 
The term  so f [T,Q(t)] [S(n,s) + αR(s,n)
T
∫ ]dn = 0
(13)  ( )
dT
= e−rT [ ( )∂T
∂C T − t − rC(T − t)] + f [s,Q(t)][S(t,s) + αR(t,n)
t
T∫ ]ds 
and we get the expected result that the target date of completion of the pipeline is when 
expected marginal benefits are equal to the marginal cost. There are two problems. First, 
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the distribution function on the probability that the constraint will be binding is not well 
defined and depends on such factors as the performance of the United States economy. 
Second, the solution depends on the subjective value of the parameter α . The outcome is 
substantially a function of the choice of α . If we assume that the demand function is 
locally linear then 
ΔQp
ηQ  (14) Δp =
and 
ΔpΔQ
2
 S(s,n) =(15)  
and 
R(s,n)(16) = ΔpQ 
Δp
 
so ratio  
(17) ρ = Q 2ΔpΔQ
2
= Q ΔQ = e
2
α ( t−T ) −1 ≈
2
α (t − T )  
If we assume α = .06  and T − t = 1 ρ =
12
, then  and α (t − T ) .005= 400. Note, however, 
that the solution depends on the value of α  which is subjective. 
5. Timing of Investment in Pipeline Capacity: An Alternate Approach 
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Let us again consider the case when gas is being transmitted a distance L over a 
pipe line of diameter D. The demand for gas is given by  
(18) Q(t) = eαtQ D(p)0   
where α is a random variable with mean α p and p is a random variable with mean  . The 
pressure limit on the pipeline is Q and we will define T  such that Q = eα T Q0D(p ).  
Assume that initial demand is given by Q 
2
 so the expect time for the pipeline to 
reach full capacity is t = ln(2)α Now let us consider a sequence of investment such that 
pipeline capacity is doubled every time the pipeline reaches full capacity. Thus there is a 
sequence of investments at Ti, where Ti = Ti−1 + t . Let c  be the charge for transporting 
gas. The present value of the revenues of the pipeline are given by 
1
(19) PV1 = e− irt 
i= 0
∑∞ Q 2 c10
t ∫ e(α −r)sds = c1Q 2(1− e−rt )((α − r) [1− e
(α −r)t ]
(1− e−rt )
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟  
Now consider any other sequence of investment T , where T ˜ i ˜ i ˜ T i= −1 + ˜ t c2. and let  be 
the charge for transporting gas. Then  
(20) PV2 = e−ir˜ t 
i=0
∞∑ Q 2 c20
˜ t ∫ e(α −ir)sds = c2Q 2(α − r) [1− e
(α −r) ˜ t ]
(1− e−r˜ t )
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ . 
 
If we assume the consumer of natural gas is paying for the buffer capacity, then 
 and PV1 = PV2
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⎛
(21) c1Q 
2(1− e−rt )((α − r)
[1− e(α −r )t ]
(1− e−rt )
 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ c
⎠ ⎟ =
2
⎛Q 
2(α − r)
[1− e(α −r ) ˜ t ]
(1− e−r˜ t )
 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟  
or 
(22) c2
c1
= [1− e
(α −r )t ](1− e−r˜ t )
[1− e(α −r )˜ t ](1− e−rt )  
and the difference in he costs can be expressed as a function  of 1, c
c − c = [1− e
(⎛
(23) 2 1
α −r)t ](1− e−r˜ t )
[1− e(α −r)˜ t ](1− e−rt )
 ⎜ −1⎞ ⎟ c⎠ 1. ⎝ 
The cost per thousand cubic feet of gas transported for maintaining a t − t˜   buffer of 
excess capacity, ΔC  is given by substituting into equations (19) and (20). 
(24)ΔC = c e−rt1
0
t ∫ [1− e(⎛ α −r)t ](1− e−r˜ t )[1− e(α −r)˜ t ](1− e−rt )
 ⎜ −1⎞ ⎟ dt = 1⎠ r
⎛
⎝ 
[1− e(α −r)t ](1− e−r˜ t )
[1− e(α −r)˜ t ](1− e−rt )
 ⎜ −1⎞ ⎟ (1− e−r˜ t )c⎠ 1 ⎝ 
Let us calculate a simple example assuming that r = .12 and α = .06 ,  and that the 
cost without a buffer is $.10 per 1000 cubic feet. If there is no buffer then at a growth rate 
of six percent a year, t =11.5. Table 1 below gives the cost per MCF of maintaining 
excess buffer capacity. 
Cost per Year of Pipeline Buffer Capacity 
Year Change in Tariff 
dollars 
Present Value of Cost 
dollars 
1 .006 9.37 
2 .013 19.32 
3 .020 29.12 
4 .027 41.12 
5 .035 53.04 
Table 1 
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Now consider a consumer that purchases an amount of gas Q  over the period (01 ,t )
Δp =
. The 
consumer faces two alternatives: First, the consumer can pay an transport charge  and 
run the risk that the pipeline will be congested; or second the consumer can run the risk 
that the pipeline will become congested. 
c1
Suppose that it is possible to create a market mechanism to allocate gas if the pipeline 
becomes congested. This is unlikely, but it is a lower bound of the expected cost. The 
increase is price is given by 
p
η
ΔQ(23) 
Q 
, 
gfor the period during which the pipeline is congested. Let (t)
E[Z(t)] = g(t)e−rt
T∫ pη
 be the probability that the 
pipeline will be congested at time t. The present value of the expect rents the consumer 
will pay over the planning period pay is: 
ΔQ dt(24)  
0
. 
Q 
Note that there are three random elements in this expression, the net back price, p, at the 
time of congestion, the percentage of above full capacity ΔQ
Q 
, and the probability that the 
pipeline will be congested. Of these random variables, the net back price is the only one 
for which there exists published forecasts and historically these have not been very 
accurate. 
Using the Mean Value Theorem 
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(25) g(t)e
0
−rt
t p∫ η ΔQQ dt = ηˆ p Δ
ˆ Q 
Q 
g(t)e
0
−rt
t 
−r∫ dt > e t ˆ p η Δ
ˆ Q 
Q 
t  
e−rT
ˆ p 
η
Δ ˆ Q Since we are evaluating the integral at the end point, T. The expression,
Q 
T
e−rT
ˆ p 
, is a 
lower bound of the expected cost of congestion to the consumer. If we assume that 
consumers are risk neutral, we can construct a variable such that 
(26) η
Δ ˆ Q Δ ˆ Q T = e−rT ˆ p 
Q η Q πt = e
−rT ˆ p 
η θt
θ = Δ ˆ Q 
 
In this formulation, 
Q 
π  is the expected over capacity and t is the number of days 
the pipeline is congested.  Thus we an express a lower bound of the tradeoff for 
consumers between buffer capacity to the pipeline and days of expected over capacity for 
a given value of θ . 
⎛
 (27)  e−rt 
ˆ p 
η θt =
1
r
[1− e(α −r )t ](1− e−r˜ t )
[1− e(α −r )˜ t ](1− e−rt )
 ⎜ −1⎞⎝ 
 ⎟ (1− e−r˜ t )c
t = e
r
⎠ 1 
which can be solved for t. 
(28) 
t η ⎛
θˆ pr
[1− e(α −r) t ](1− e−r˜ t )
[1− e(α −r) ˜ t ](1− e−rt )
 ⎜ ⎞ ⎟ (1− e−r˜ t )c⎠ 1   −1}⎝ 
Figure A below gives the relationship for a price of gas of $3.00 per MCF. To 
illustrate, an individual whose subjective expectation is that θ = .04  would rather pay the 
costs associated with two years of excess capacity rather than risk 31.6 days of 
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congestion. An individual whose subjective expectation is that θ = .12 would rather pay 
the costs associated with two years of excess capacity rather than risk 10.6 days of 
congestion. 
 
Figure 7 
 
Similar calculations can be performed for other assumptions about the price of 
gas. Alternatively, it is possible to examine the relationship between days of congestion 
and the price of gas for a fixed amount of amount of buffer. This is illustrated in Figure 
B. Suppose the price of gas is expected to be in the range of $3.00 to $6.00, then 
individuals whose subjective expectation of θ  was greater than .04 would rather pay for 
two years of excess capacity rather than risk 30 days of congestion.  
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An Example 2-24- 
 
To get an intuitive insight as to what could lead to 30 days of congestion, it is  
useful to compute a simple example. Assume that a pipeline has an increase of 
throughput that grows at six percent a year.  If initial throughput is Q 
2
 where the capacity 
of the pipeline is Q we can expect the pipeline to be congested in 11.5 years.  Now 
suppose that after 9.5 years the growth rate increased by a one percent so that α = .07. 
The question is how days of congestion will result at θ .04? The quick answer is 34. If =
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throughput is growing at a rate α = .06, then after 8.5 years throughput will be equal to 
1.67Q 
2
.  At a growth rate of .07 after the ninth year the pipeline will reach capacity after 
11.12  years. The number of days of congestion at θ = .04
1)dt
 is 
Tc =
(e.07t
0
.43∫ −
.04 × = 34. .43
The numerator is the cumulative θ  and the dominator normalizes it for θ = .04 . 
Using very naïve calculations, a growth rate of .07 rather than .06 in the last three years 
of the planning period would result in over 30 days of congestion. The real world is very 
much more complicated and there are problems such as construction delays, weather, 
macro-economic shocks, or war in the Middle East. The cost of buffer capacity is low 
and the cost of transfers that result from congestion to the consumers of gas of congestion 
is very high.  
This completely ignores social and political costs that would result if the gas 
pipeline system becomes congested and gas cannot flow to clear the market. 
6. Conclusions 
 
The fact that the demand for gas is very inelastic in Mexico is a two edged sword 
with respect to the administration of the net back rule for pricing gas. On one hand, a 
very small change in the demand for gas can lead to a large change in the arbitration 
point, however on the other hand the fact that the demand for gas is very inelastic means 
that the welfare loss associated with the pricing of gas based on an artificial pricing point 
is very small. Cempoala is about 500 miles from Los Ramones so a shift of the arbitrage 
point from Los Ramones to Cempoala would lead to a change in the price of gas of 
approximately $.50 per MCF. However at a price of $3.50 per MCF the welfare loss 
associated keeping the arbitrage point at Los Ramones is on the order of one third cent 
per MCF. Since very small changes in the demand for gas can lead to substantial changes 
in the net back price and since the welfare losses from maintaining an artificial point for 
price are low, the question is more political than economic. The opportunity cost of gas 
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based on the Houston market can be used to argue why natural gas in Mexico should not 
be used to produce ammonia nitrate. It is harder to use that price to justify why a factory 
in Puebla should pay substantially more for gas than a factory in Monterrey. As 
illustrated in the example of the tortillería, this is particularly true when a very small 
change in the pattern of demand can lead to a substantial change in the price of gas. The 
fact that the demand for gas is very inelastic means that the welfare cost of keeping price 
of gas stable in Mexico is low. 
Similarly, the fact that the demand for gas is very inelastic in Mexico is a two 
edged sword with respect to pipeline capacity. A ten percent increase in demand would 
result in a one hundred percent increase in the price that would clear the market is gas is 
not free to flow to maintain the net back price. However the fact that the demand is so 
inelastic permits the implementation of a very simple rate structure and appears to justify 
investment in substantial buffer capacity. Such capacity may be Pareto superior. 
Substantiation of the latter conjecture is beyond the limited scope of this paper. However, 
calculations suggest that users would prefer to pay for excess capacity in the pipeline 
system than to risk the consequences of congestion. Since the parameters needed to 
calculate this result are subject, it must remain a conjecture. Experience in the United 
States suggests that such periods of congestion do occur. The price of gas in the United 
States is set by market forces and an equilibrium can be reached. The netback rule, 
however, requires that gas be able to flow to achieve equilibrium.  
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